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Abstract
In two studies, we investigated the memory underpinnings of future intentions related to
past hedonic experiences. Preceding research did not make clear whether the specific
memory processes supporting the expression of intentions about the future involve global
judgments of the past experience (general affective evaluations formed on-line) or judg-
ments derived from the episodic recollection of the past. Adapting a correlational paradigm
previously employed to study future intentions, and applying it to the experience of watching
a movie, we comparatively tested the influence of global retrospective evaluations vs. epi-
sodic-derived evaluations on future intentions. In Study 1, in which the intentions involved
a future experience that was very similar to an overall past one (e.g., seeing the movie
sequel), the findings showed that participants relied only on global judgments to form future
intentions. In Study 2, in which the global judgment on the past was less diagnostic because
the future intentions referred to specific parts of the past experience (e.g., watching a movie
centered on a minor character in the previously seen movie), the results indicated that rele-
vant episodic memories provided an essential contribution to the prediction of future inten-
tions. These findings are in agreement with the predictions of the accessibility-diagnosticity
framework and they show that global judgments and episodic memories of a past experi-
ence contribute differentially to diverse kinds of future intentions.
Introduction
Last week you watched a movie on TV and found it nice. Now, talking with a friend, you hear
that its sequel will be played in your town in some days. Your friend asks you whether you are
interested in watching the sequel. What will drive your future intentions? The studies pre-
sented in this paper aim to answer this question, tackling the open issue of the identification of
memory bases of future intentions about hedonic experiences, a topic that has strong theoreti-
cal and applied relevance. In their seminal work, Wirtz and colleagues [1] showed that the
intention to repeat a past experience (i.e., the willingness to repeat a holiday) does not depend
on the actual experience but on individuals’ memory of that experience (see also [2]). How-
ever, research on future intentions has still not made clear what “memory” means in this
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context, because it has not specified what kinds of memories are used in formulating inten-
tions about future experiences closely related to past ones. Our studies aim to fill this signifi-
cant gap.
The background of the work reported in this paper stems from the integration of the acces-
sibility-diagnosticity framework [3] with Hastie and Park’s theoretical distinction between
on-line evaluations and memory-based judgments [4], complemented by related studies.
Although these two frameworks were not originally applied to future intentions about hedonic
experiences, we will show that their integration allows for making specific predictions in the
future intention domain, predictions that we tested in two empirical studies on a movie
experience.
Hastie and Park [4] drew (and empirically supported) a distinction between on-line evalua-
tions of incoming information, which lead to global judgments that can be retrieved at a later
stage, and memory-based judgments, which are expressed retrospectively by relying on pur-
posely-retrieved episodic information. Global judgments are routinely formed (for instance
when forming an impression about an experience or a person) and used prospectively by
default whenever needed, while memory-based judgments are rather infrequent and usually
articulated only when a global judgment is not already available. Betsch and colleagues [5]
showed also that evaluative summative judgments may be formed implicitly after encoding of
value-charged stimuli, while Hermans and colleagues [6] suggested that semantic memory
may have the function of assuring access to global evaluations about the options. To summa-
rize, Hastie and Park’s distinction, and later studies, highlighted two potential routes to future
intentions: (a) the retrieval of a summative judgment about the past experience that can be
used as a basis to express the future intention (default route); (b) the recollection of episodic
memories about the past experience and their evaluation to formulate the future intention.
However, this view does not fully make clear what the conditions leading to the activation of
one or the other mechanism are.
The accessibility-diagnosticity framework is helpful in this respect [3]. This framework has
been applied mainly to choices between different brands [7], word-of-mouth effects (e.g., [8]),
effect of advertising on decisions (e.g., [9]), effect of measurement in survey research (e.g.,
[10]), and interference of post-experience information on overall judgments about an experi-
ence (e.g., [11]; for a review, see [12]). In the present paper, we aim to extend it to future inten-
tion of hedonic experiences. Following the framework, it can be postulated that a given
memory source (e.g., a pre-existing global evaluation or a specific episodic memory) will be
used to formulate a judgment if it is more accessible and more diagnostic than alternative
sources [3], with accessibility defined as ease of retrieval and diagnosticity as the degree to
which the input is perceived to accomplish the evaluative goal at hand. Lynch and colleagues
[7] hypothesized that information sources are sampled from memory sequentially according
to their accessibility, but used only if perceived as sufficiently diagnostic, and that the search
process stops when a cumulative diagnosticity threshold is reached [13].
In line with these views, it can be assumed that, in a common hedonic situation, individuals
can retrieve two main sources of information from their memory in order to formulate a
future intention starting from a past experience: a global judgment about the past experience
and a pool of episodic memories related to that experience. Recollection-based judgments of
future intentions will be viable only when episodic information is still accessible and can be
retrieved (thus, generally after a few days or a week after the experience; see [14, 15]). When
the delay is longer and episodic memories fade away, the global judgment will be preferred.
When the delay between the experience and the expression of intentions is short (i.e. within
one week), however, both global judgments and episodic memories should be accessible.
In that case, if both sources are also equally diagnostic, using the global judgment for the
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intentions should be the default, considering that retrieving a global judgment is much faster
than retrieving more specific relevant information [16] and that evaluating or aggregating the
latter kind of information in a judgment may imply additional costs. Converging support
comes by fuzzy trace theorists, who advocated the prevailing use of global gist-based (vs.
verbatim) representations in reasoning tasks by relying on functional considerations (see e.g.,
[17, 18]).
Indeed, according to a rational analysis (e.g., [19–21]), future intentions should be
grounded on memory-based judgments only when perceived benefits, in terms of more accu-
rate prediction of future enjoyment and satisfaction, exceed the additional retrieval and evalua-
tion costs, albeit the individuals’ degree of rationality still needing to be demonstrated in this
specific context. In line with this consideration, when the delay between the experience and
the expression of judgments is short but global judgments are not sufficiently diagnostic (i.e.,
they do not fit the evaluation requested), individuals should retrieve also relevant episodic
memories and use them to formulate future intentions (see also [7]).
Overview of the studies and hypotheses
In two studies, we tested the previously specified hypotheses about the memory bases of future
intentions related to the hedonic experience of watching a movie. The movie scenario has
been used frequently in previous research (e.g., [22–24]) because it allows exerting experimen-
tal control while retaining the ecological validity of a real hedonic experience.
In particular, we tested our hypotheses under a short time frame (i.e., when both global
judgments and episodic memories are still accessible) and varying the diagnosticity of the
overall evaluations vs. specific episodic memories for expressing intentions (by changing the
target of the future intention). We expected that participants would have preferentially used
the global judgment when it was diagnostic for the target of future intentions (H1), but that
they would have resorted also to relevant episodic memories of the past experience when the
global judgment was made less diagnostic by changing the target of intentions (H2) (e.g.,
[3, 7]).
We tested H1 in Study 1, in which the intentions involved a future experience very similar
to an overall past one (e.g., seeing the movie sequel), and H2 in Study 2, in which the future
intentions were related only to specific parts of the past experience (e.g., watching a movie cen-
tred on a minor character in the previously seen movie). Future intentions were expressed one
week after the viewing session, so that both global evaluations and episodic traces were highly
accessible and could be easily retrieved (i.e., a short time frame according to [14]; see also
[25]). Indeed, there seems to be good agreement on the fact that individuals switch to global
judgments when episodic traces are difficult to retrieve (e.g., when the time lag between the
experience and the expression of the intention about the future increases; see also [26]).
In our studies, we adapted a correlational paradigm that has been previously used to iden-
tify the relative roles of expectancies, online evaluations, and memory on the intention to
repeat a hedonic experience [1]. Specifically, our adaptation of this paradigm allowed disentan-
gling the role of global judgment vs. episodic recollection on future intentions, while control-
ling for the influence of prior expectancies on the actual experience and on both kinds of
retrospective evaluations. Indeed, any proper investigation of the memory bases of future
intentions needs to control for the influence of expectancies, because they may strongly influ-
ence actual enjoyment (e.g., [1, 24, 27]) and retrospective judgments [1, 24, 26]. Failure to do
so can lead to misinterpretation of research findings. Moreover, considering both specific
memory processes and the role of expectancies will offer a more complete and insightful
account of the intention formation process.
Memory underpinnings of future intentions
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Study 1
Method
Participants. One hundred and twenty undergraduates took part in the study (84%
females, age: M = 21.10, SD = 3.93), none of whom had seen the movie before.
All participants provided their informed oral consent prior to inclusion in the studies, dur-
ing the participants’ enrollment phase (the experimenter registered the participants who gave
their consent). Given the low-risk nature of the studies, written consent was not considered
necessary. This procedure and the studies were approved by the Human Research Ethics Com-
mittee of the University of Trieste in compliance with APA Ethical Guidelines and the Code of
Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects of the World Medical Asso-
ciation (Declaration of Helsinki).
Procedure and materials. Participants were recruited after announcements made during
course lessons and via the University online message boards. After expressing their willingness
to participate in the study, they were randomly assigned to small groups (that ranged from 15
to 30 participants each), and they were invited in a specific date and time in one of the Univer-
sity buildings. The study was carried out in two collective sessions. In the first session, partici-
pants were asked to take place in an experimental facility equipped with loudspeakers and
cinema screen. Participants were told that we were interested in studying the reception of
movies and that they would watch a movie-excerpt. The video was taken from the movie Cara-
mel [28], a 2007 Lebanese comedy/light drama. The movie focuses on the daily lives of five
Lebanese women living in Beirut, each of them having their own issues. The movie has been
already used in previous research [29–30], showing that it was moderately pleasant and rela-
tively easy to be processed. Indeed, we were interested in testing a common viewing situation,
and we wanted to avoid floor or ceiling effects that might result from very pleasant or very bad
movie experiences. Moreover, the movie is not well-known in the country in which the study
took place, and this reduces the possibility that participants had seen the movie before.
Participants read a short passage of text describing the movie’s plot and then they expressed
their expectancies about the movie on a 6-item questionnaire (after [1, 24, 31]). Judgments
about expected interest, pleasantness, general involvement, satisfaction, emotional involve-
ment, and enjoyment were provided by ticking 7-point scales ranging from not at all to very
much (Cronbach’s α = .89) and an expectancies score was computed by averaging these rat-
ings. Next, participants watched an excerpt of the movie Caramel [28]. The movie was inter-
rupted after twenty-eight minutes, when a scene ended, so that the interruption was not
abrupt. Following previous studies, online experience was measured with two methods: online
experience sampling (e.g., [32]) and immediate evaluation after the experience (e.g., [24]). Half
of the participants rated how pleasant they found the movie every four minutes on a 7-point
rating scale, ranging from not at all to very much (see also [22]), while the other half provided
an overall rating only once, just after the end of the movie excerpt (see also [24]). In particular,
each randomly-assigned participant received one of two different versions of a booklet. In the
first version, the booklet included multiple pages with a single question asking how pleasant
they found the movie. Every four minutes, after being prompted by the experimenter, partici-
pants had to answer this question by ticking the scale point best reflecting their current evalua-
tion and turn the booklet page. Participants with the alternative version of the booklet were
presented with multiple pages presenting a single filler question (“Is there any person on the
screen right now?”) and, at the end, they rated how pleasant they found the movie. The evalua-
tion breaks during the movie were chosen so that they were sufficiently long-spaced to avoid
interrupting the narrative flow, but at the same time sufficiently frequent to ensure a rather
comprehensive sampling of the hedonic experience (moreover the breaks did not interrupt
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important scenes or dialogues). The evaluation ratings of these two groups were then pooled,
given that the overall final rating of the latter group did not differ from the last rating of the
repeated rating group, t(118) = 1.42, p = .16 (additionally, the modelling results presented in
the next section do not change if the online score is composed by the average of the repeated
ratings, showing that they are robust to variation in the assessment of the online experience).
After the completion of the first session, we told participants to come for the second session in
the same place after one week. Moreover, participants were asked not to talk about the study
with other participants/friends and not to watch the rest of the movie or collect information
about it.
During the second session of the study, one week after the first, we collected the two mem-
ory-related measures and elicited future intentions. The order of the memory-related measures
was counterbalanced, with the future intentions measure interleaved to minimize carry-over
effects. In the recollection-based (episodic) measure (see also e.g., [23, 4]), participants had to
recall as many scenes as possible in ten minutes and then they had to rate each retrieved scene
for its pleasantness, vividness, and emotional involvement on 7-point scales, ranging from not
at all to very much. A score for each of these three dimensions was then derived by averaging
ratings on the first five scenes recalled (Cronbach’s α = .68, .80, and .78, respectively). In the
next section, we will present results based on the episodic-derived score of pleasantness over
the first five scenes recalled, given that all participants recalled at least five scenes. However,
results were similar also when considering the whole set of retrieved scenes (details are re-
ported in the results section and in S1 Appendix). In the global retrospective evaluation of the
movie experience, participants were asked to evaluate the movie by answering the same ques-
tionnaire used to assess expectancies (see also [1]), but with the verbs in the past tense (Cron-
bach’s α = .94) and a global retrospective evaluation score was computed by averaging these
ratings.
A 6-item questionnaire with 7-point rating scales was used to elicit future intentions. The
items were adapted from items that had been already used to investigate future intentions.
Starting from questions on the intention to repeat an experience similar to the past one used in
previous studies on future intentions [1, 22, 24], we designed four items for the movie context:
the willingness to watch the rest of the movie, its sequel, a movie by the same director, with the
same actors (ranging from not at all to very much). Moreover, we included one item about the
willingness to pay (WTP) in order to see all the movie (seven options: €0, €1-€2, €2-€3, €3-€4,
€4-€5, €5-€6, €7, converted in a value between 1 and 7—we note that the item values are not
disjunctive and this may have induced a measurement error, but excluding this item from the
intention score did not change the results). WTP questions are commonly used in economic
psychology and are thought to reflect attitudes toward target items (e.g., [33]). The final item,
asking the willingness to suggest the movie to a friend (ranging from certainly not to certainly
yes), was derived from consumer research studies in which recommendation to others is used
as an indicator of future intentions (e.g., [34]). The future intentions score was obtained by
averaging responses to these six items (Cronbach’s α = .89).
Results and discussion
Participants recalled a high number of scenes (M = 8.30, SD = 1.68), which were evaluated as
vivid (Mvividness = 5.43, SD = 1.07), significantly above the mid-point of the scale, t(118) =
14.61, p< .001. Additionally, we checked that the retrieved scenes were reported in sufficient
detail to be considered as based on actual episodic recollection and they were found to be accu-
rate representations of what happened in the corresponding part of the movie. In particular,
we considered as a valid episodic recollection a scene report that was sufficiently detailed to
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allow a precise identification of a specific scene in the movie, explicitly mentioning specific
events, places, actions performed, objects, and so on (cf. [35]). Scenes not meeting these
requirements were considered as inaccurately reported. Accuracy of a scene report was further
assessed by evaluating the correspondence between the report and the actual scene of the
movie. Scenes were evaluated by two independent judges with good inter-rater agreement
(Cohen’s kappa = .71, computed on a random selection—10%—of retrieved scenes). Disagree-
ments were reconciled through the raters’ joint discussion. The analysis showed that over the
95% of the retrieved scenes were valid episodic recollections. This shows that episodic infor-
mation was highly accessible and accurate after one week from the experience. The episodic-
derived score was computed on the pleasantness ratings of the first (and presumably more
accessible) five scenes because all participants reported at least five scenes. However, given that
it is possible to argue that some of the scenes that come to mind are more weighted than the
other (e.g., [22]) or that the episodic judgment is more dependent on the most pleasant scene
(e.g., [36–37]) we did a sensitivity analysis, testing several models with varying number of
scenes in order to show that results do not change. Path analysis results presented in the next
section did not change even when using the whole set of retrieved scenes to compute the epi-
sodic-derived score (see S1 Appendix).
The order of administration of memory measures did not affect episodic-derived evalua-
tions (4.24 vs. 4.41), t(118) = 0.81, p = .420, global retrospective evaluations (4.66 vs. 4.41),
t(118) = 1.29, p = .199, or future intentions (4.53 vs. 4.25), t(118) = 1.37, p = .173, so it was not
considered any further.
Following previous studies [1, 2], path analysis was used for hypothesis testing. Models
were estimated with the maximum likelihood method of the IBM SPSS AMOS 21 package
[38]. We reported indices of fit that are commonly used in literature (the cut-off values that
represent a good fit are reported between parentheses; see [39]): χ2 (not significant), χ2/df
( 3), SRMR ( .09), RMSEA ( .05), CFI ( .95). Moreover, we reported three descriptive
goodness-of-fit criteria to compare models: the Bayes information criterion (BIC), the Akaike’s
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Consistent AIC (CAIC). The matrix of correlations
between variables is reported in the S1 Appendix. The models were specified by following pre-
vious studies [1, 2], which assumed (and observed) a sequential chain of relations between
expectancies, on-line evaluation, retrospective evaluation, and intentions (see Fig 1).
However, in order to test the role of global retrospective evaluation and episodic-derived
evaluation on the intentions related to similar future experiences, we included in the models
the two distinct measures of retrospective evaluation (i.e., global retrospective evaluation and
episodic-derived evaluation) and we tested separately two alternative models including a selec-
tive link between one of these measures and future intentions. Intentions were supposed to be
selectively predicted by global retrospective evaluation in the first model, and by episodic-
derived evaluation in the second model. Given that some studies reported that episodic recol-
lection may be used as a basis for the retrospective evaluation formation [14], we initially
included a correlational link between the two memory measures. In both the models, this rela-
tionship was not significant (β = .16, SE = .06, p = .084 for both models), so we removed this
link from the final models. The global judgment model showed a good fit to the data according
Fig 1. The structure of Wirtz and colleagues model [1].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176624.g001
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to standard measures, χ2(4) = 9.60, p = .048, χ2/df = 2.40, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .11 (even if
the index should be lower than .05, it has been shown that it over-rejects models with small
sample size; see [39]), CFI = .98, BIC = 62.26, AIC = 31.60, CAIC = 73.26. Fig 2A shows that
global retrospective evaluation strongly predicted intentions (β = .85, SE = .05, p< .001),
accounting for a large proportion of variance (R2 = .72). Conversely, the episodic judgment
model (Fig 2B) showed unsatisfactory indices of fit, χ2(4) = 126.81, p< .001, χ2/df = 31.70,
SRMR = .23, RMSEA = .56, CFI = .67, BIC = 179.47, AIC = 148.81, CAIC = 190.47. In addi-
tion, the fit of a model in which intentions were predicted by both retrospective measures (Fig
Fig 2. Path analysis models in Study 1. Path analysis models for the test of the global judgment model (panel A) vs. episodic judgment model (panel
B) and the full path model (panel C). Numbers close to the arrows are standardized path coefficients. Those above the boxes indicate explained
variance (R2). Significance levels are as follows: ^ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176624.g002
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2C) was not better than the fit of the global judgment model, χ2diff (1) = 3.43, p = .064, and the
explained variance was the same (R2 = .72). Moreover, this model confirmed that the global
retrospective evaluation is a much better predictor of intentions (β = .80, SE = .06, p< .001)
than the episodic-derived evaluation (β = .10, SE = .05, p = .051).
Furthermore, the retrospective judgment model was the best-fitting model even when the
episodic-derived evaluation score (computed with the first five recalled scenes) was replaced
with a score computed with all the scenes or just using the most pleasant scene (see [36]; see S1
Appendix).
The good-fitting global judgment model also showed that expectancies influenced on-line
evaluation (β = .61, SE = .11, p< .001), which, in turn, affected both kinds of retrospective
evaluation measures (global retrospective evaluation: β = .61, SE = .06, p< .001; episodic-
derived evaluation: β = .35, SE = .09, p< .001). Expectancies had also a significant direct effect
on the global evaluation (β = .28, SE = .08, p< .001) and on the episodic-derived evaluation
(β = .21, SE = .13, p = .031).
It is important to point out that we started from a general and independently-supported
model frame, hypothesizing a sequential chain of relations between expectancies, online evalu-
ation, memory, and intentions (e.g., [1, 2]) and that we teased out the memory component in
order to clarify the specific contribution of episodic-derived vs. global evaluations via focused
hypothesis testing. Given that some alternative models might be still viable within this general
theoretical context, we tested the more plausible ones. In particular, alternative models includ-
ing direct relations from expectancies to intentions or from online evaluation to intentions,
showed non-significant paths (β = .10, SE = .08, p = .098, for the link between expectancies and
intentions; β = .12, SE = .07, p = .107, for the link between online evaluation and intentions)
and the fit was not improved (χ2diff (1) = 2.71, p = .100; χ2diff (1) = 2.57, p = .109, respectively).
These results support H1 and they show that the global judgment is the basis of intentions
about similar future experiences, whereas the episodic-derived evaluation plays a small-to-null
role, even if both are accessible. Moreover, the global retrospective evaluation was not related
to the episodic-derived one, suggesting that these two potential memory bases of future inten-
tions are independent.
Study 2
Study 1 showed that when intentions refer to future hedonic experiences very similar to an
overall past one, a global retrospective judgment about the past experience is the main memory
source for the intention formation process. These findings supported H1: When the global
judgment about the past experience was diagnostic for the prediction of the future experience,
the global judgment was the preferred source for the intentions formation process, even if
both global evaluation and episodic memories of the experience were available. Starting from
this result, Study 2 tested H2: When the global retrospective judgment is not sufficiently diag-
nostic for future intentions then episodic-derived judgments should be also used as a basis in
the intention formation process (provided that they are available).
In Study 2 we employed the same movie paradigm as in Study 1, but we asked participants
to express intentions about experiences that were related only to specific parts of the past one:
namely, future experiences involving only specific characters taken from the previously-seen
movie. In this situation, only some parts of the movie are diagnostic for future intentions (i.e.,
the scenes in which the target character was actually present) and the global retrospective eval-
uation of the whole experience is only partially diagnostic, especially if the target character did
not have a major role in the movie. Thus, in order to formulate sensitive future intentions, par-
ticipants need to recall their episodic memories of the relevant parts of the movie.
Memory underpinnings of future intentions
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In Study 2, intentions and episodic recollections referred to three characters of the movie.
In order to test our specific hypotheses on the role of episodic contribution to future inten-
tions, we focused on two minor characters with opposite evaluations (one positive and one
negative). In addition, we included the main character of the movie (that was expected to be
more related to global evaluation) to highlight the different role of episodic-derived vs. global
retrospective judgments. The main character was Layale, who worked in a beauty salon in Bei-
rut along with two other women and had a relationship with a married man. She was present
very often in 28-minutes excerpt (46% of time) and was generally evaluated as attractive as the
whole movie in a pre-test. The first minor character was Lili, an old woman with mental prob-
lems, quite distinctive and funny. Participants generally like her a lot according to the pre-test.
The second minor character was Jamale, a regular customer of the beauty salon and a wannabe
actress, worried about getting old. According to the pre-test, participants generally did not like
her much. Both the minor characters appeared for a short time period in the excerpt (15% and
14% of the time). We expected that intentions involving a specific character would have been
predicted not only by the global retrospective judgment, but also—and critically so—by epi-
sodic-derived evaluations of the target character. We did not expect the global evaluation of
the movie to be completely inconsequential, given that the global evaluation may also depend
on the evaluation of the scenes including the specific character, and given that the global judg-
ment should be retrieved before the specific episodic memories according to the accessibility-
diagnosticity model [13]. Additionally, we expected to replicate the finding showing that the
global evaluation of the movie predicts future intentions about similar overall experiences.
Method
Participants. One hundred and five undergraduates who had not seen the movie took
part in the study (67% females, age: M = 22.82, SD = 5.12). Participants were recruited through
announcements and they were randomly assigned to small group (ranging from 15 to 30 par-
ticipants each) as in Study 1.
Procedure and materials. The first session of Study 2 was very similar to Study 1: Partici-
pants read the movie’s plot, they expressed their expectancies about the movie on the same
6-item questionnaire of Study 1 (Cronbach’s α = .89), and they watched the first twenty-eight
minutes of the movie Caramel [28]. Given that in Study 1 we found no difference between the
last online rating and the rating at the end of the movie, we assessed the online experience
right after the end of the movie using the same 6-item expectancies questionnaire and just
changing the verb tense (Cronbach’s α = .95). At the end of the first session, participants
received written instruction not to talk about the study with other participants or friends and
not to watch the rest of the movie nor collect information about it.
In the first session, participants were recruited and tested in small groups as in Study 1,
whereas the second session was administrated online, through the Survey Monkey software
(www.surveymonkey.com). A week after the first session, participants received an email con-
taining the link to the online questionnaire, with the explicit request for an immediate compi-
lation (all the participants completed the second session within the eighth day after the first
session in 15–25 minutes). During this session, we collected the episodic measures separately
for the three characters, the intentions related to experiences involving the three characters
(i.e., specific future intentions), the global retrospective evaluation of the movie, and the inten-
tions related to overall similar experiences (i.e., global future intention).
In the episodic measures, participants were presented with the pictures of the three charac-
ters (the main character, the minor character 1, and the minor character 2), one by one, and in
a random order. They were asked to report as many scenes as possible in which the specific
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character was present (up to five), and to evaluate each of them for pleasantness and vividness
on 7-point scales (from not at all to very much). Specific intentions for each character were
assessed using a 5-item questionnaire (main character: Cronbach’s α = .89; minor character 1:
Cronbach’s α = .92; minor character 2: Cronbach’s α = .91). These items were designed adapt-
ing the global intentions items to the specific character. In particular, participants were asked
to report on a 7-point scale (ranging from not at all to very much) how much they were inter-
ested in discovering how the story of the character continued, in watching a movie focused on
that character, in watching a movie with the same actress as main character, and if they were
willing to suggest to a friend a movie focused on that character, and a movie with the same
actress as main character. Global retrospective evaluation (Cronbach’s α = .96) and global
future intentions (Cronbach’s α = .92) were assessed using the same questionnaires of Study 1.
The order of the memory-related measures was counterbalanced, with the specific future
intentions measure interleaved and the global future intentions collected always at the end. At
the end of the session, participants were asked to evaluate the three characters along three
items (how much they liked the character, how nice and how funny the character was, ranging
from not at all to very much) as manipulation check. All the measures’ scores (expectancies,
on-line evaluation, retrospective evaluation, specific and global future intentions) were ob-
tained by averaging responses to the items of each measure.
Results and discussion
Seven participants confused a character with another, and seven failed to report scenes involv-
ing the minor character 2, thus the subsequent analyses were based on the sample of partici-
pants who correctly recollected at least one scene for each character (n = 91).
Participants recalled on average 3.91 scenes out of five in which the main character was
present (SD = 1.28), 3.45 scenes in which the minor character 1 was present (SD = 1.16), and
1.97 scenes in which the minor character 2 was present (SD = 1.11). The accuracy of the
retrieved scenes was high, ranging from 95% for the scenes involving the main character, to
90% for the scenes involving the minor character 2 (see Study 1 for the scoring criteria). As in
Study 1, scenes were evaluated by two independent judges with good inter-rater agreement
(Cohen’s kappa = .74, computed on a random selection—10%—of retrieved scenes). Memo-
ries involving the main character and the minor character 1 were evaluated as quite vivid, sig-
nificantly above the mid-point of the scale (Mvividness = 4.44, SD = 1.39), t(90) = 3.06, p = .003,
and (Mvividness = 4.60, SD = 1.35), t(90) = 4.26, p< .001, respectively, whereas recollections
involving the minor character 2 were evaluated below the mid-point of the scale (Mvividness =
3.71, SD = 1.40), t(90) = 1.97, p = .052. These results show that episodic recollections were
highly accessible for the main character and the minor character 1, but the episodic recollec-
tion involving the minor character 2 was more difficult (we will discuss this further in the
paper). An episodic-derived evaluation score was computed for each character, by averaging
the pleasantness ratings of the scenes recalled by participants.
The order of administration of memory measures did not affect episodic-derived evalua-
tions, main character, t(89) = 0.43, p = .668, minor character 1, t(89) = 0.54, p = .589, minor
character 2, t(89) = 0.73, p = .470; global retrospective evaluations, t(89) = 1.78, p = .078; spe-
cific future intentions, main character, t(89) = 0.56, p = .574, minor character 1, t(89) = 0.12,
p = .908, minor character 2, t(89) = 0.61, p = .546; and global future intentions, t(89) = 1.67,
p = .098, therefore it was not considered any further.
As in Study 1, path analysis was used for hypothesis testing. The matrix of correlations
between variables is reported in the S1 Appendix. The models were specified by following
Study 1, including expectancies, online evaluation, episodic-derived evaluations for each
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character, global retrospective evaluation, specific future intentions for each character, and
global future intentions. In all the models, we tested the influence of expectancies on the online
evaluation, and the influence of expectancies and on-line evaluation on all the memory mea-
sures (after that, we removed the non-significant links and re-estimated the models). The three
episodic-derived measures and the three specific intentions measures were supposed to be cor-
related in all the models: Given that characters rarely appeared alone in the movie, we expected
the evaluations to be related. In line with the results of Study 1, we supposed that global retro-
spective evaluation was able to predict global future intentions. We included in the models
also a possible relation between specific intentions about the main character and global future
intentions, given that the movie is mainly based on the main character and the main character
appeared often during the movie.
The first model tested the hypothesis (H2) that both the episodic-derived evaluations and
the global retrospective evaluation predicted specific intentions (see Fig 3). That is, the global
retrospective evaluation was supposed to predict both global and specific intentions, while the
episodic-derived evaluations of each character were supposed to predict the specific intentions
related to the corresponding character (Fig 3). The model showed a good fit to the data accord-
ing to the standard measures, χ2(23) = 31.88, p = .103, χ2/df = 1.39, SRMR = .05, RMSEA =
.07, CFI = .99, BIC = 176.22, AIC = 95.88, CAIC = 208.22. Results showed that main character
intentions were predicted, in a similar way, by global retrospective evaluation (β = .43, SE =
.07, p< .001) and by episodic-derived evaluation (β = .47, SE = .07, p< .001), accounting for
the 60% of the variance. The minor character 1 intentions were predicted especially by epi-
sodic-derived evaluation (β = .63, SE = .07, p< .001) and, to a lower extent, by global retro-
spective evaluation (β = .17, SE = .09, p = .038), accounting for the 52% of the variance. The
Fig 3. Path analysis model in Study 2. Path analysis model of Study 2, in which both global judgment and episodic-derived evaluations
of each character predicted specific intentions. Numbers close to the arrows are standardized path coefficients. Those above the boxes
indicate explained variance (R2). Significance levels are as follows: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0176624.g003
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minor character 2 intentions were predicted in a similar way by both global retrospective eval-
uation (β = .32, SE = .08, p = .002) and episodic-derived evaluation (β = .29, SE = .08, p = .002),
accounting for the 28% of the variance. In line with Study 1, global future intentions were
strongly predicted by global retrospective evaluation (β = .76, SE = .07, p< .001), and slightly by
the main character specific intentions (β = .16, SE = .07, p = .020), accounting for a great amount
of variance (75%). In addition, expectancies influenced online evaluation (β = .48, SE = .12, p<
.001), which, in turn, influenced all memory measures (βs> .41, ps< .001). Direct effects of
expectancies on retrospective measures were found for episodic-derived evaluation of the main
character (β = .18, SE = .11, p = .049) and of the minor character 1 (β = -.20, SE = .14, p = .031),
while for the global retrospective evaluation the effect was weaker than in Study 1 and nonsig-
nificant (β = .08, SE = .06, p = .112). In summary, these findings show that, when future inten-
tions refer to a specific part of the past experience, both episodic-derived evaluations and global
retrospective evaluation contribute to the intentions formation process, in agreement with H2.
In order to better understand whether the episodic-derived evaluation or the global retro-
spective evaluation suffice to predict a specific intention, we tested two alternative models. In
the global judgment model, specific intentions were supposed to be predicted only by the ret-
rospective global evaluation, whereas in the episodic model specific intentions were supposed
to be predicted only by the episodic-derived evaluation of the corresponding character. The
remaining parts of the models were unchanged. Results showed unacceptable fit indices
according to the standard measures, both for the global judgment model, χ2(26) = 107.17,
p< .001, χ2/df = 4.12, SRMR = .13, RMSEA = .19, CFI = .88, BIC = 237.98, AIC = 165.17,
CAIC = 266.98, and for the episodic-derived model, χ2(26) = 61.66, p< .001, χ2/df = 2.37,
SRMR = .12, RMSEA = .12, CFI = .95, BIC = 192.47, AIC = 119.66, CAIC = 221.47. Moreover,
the initial model we tested (the one including the influence of both kinds of predictors; Fig 3)
showed a better fit to the data than either the global judgment model, χ2diff (3) = 75.29, p<
.001, or the episodic-derived model, χ2diff (3) = 29.78, p< .001.
As in Study 1, the models we tested are theoretically-grounded and based on the derived
hypotheses. As noted before for Study 1, other alternative models are still possible, although
they are more complex and they do not necessarily improve the model fit. Indeed, models in
which global and specific intentions were predicted by expectancies or by online evaluation
did not improve the fit with respect to our final model (χ2diff (4) = 2.74, p = .603; χ2diff (4) =
6.1521, p = .188, respectively). Moreover, a model in which episodic-derived evaluation of the
main character (that should be more consistent with the whole experience) predicted global
intentions showed a nonsignificant path (β = .04, SE = .07, p = .553) and did not improve the
fit of the model (χ2diff (1) = 0.32, p = .572).
Taken together, these results show that the episodic-derived evaluations are needed to pre-
dict specific intentions and that the global retrospective evaluation of the movie does not suf-
fice. Therefore, Study 2 supported our second hypothesis: When the global judgment was not
sufficiently diagnostic for future intentions, relevant episodic traces were recollected and used
as a source for the judgment, along with the global evaluation. In addition, we replicated the
results of Study 1, by showing that the global judgment was the more important source of
information for similar future experiences.
The extent to which global and episodic-derived evaluations affected specific intentions var-
ied across the three characters considered: The episodic-derived evaluation was the preferred
source for the intentions related to the minor character 1 (β = .63 vs. β = .17), while both
sources affected in a similar way the intentions related to the main character (β = .47 vs. β =
.43, respectively) and to the minor character 2 (β = .29 vs. β = .32, respectively). Although we
did not formulate a priori hypotheses about specific characters, the accessibility-diagnosticity
framework can offer a reasonable post-hoc account of the influence of the two memory
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sources varying across characters. In the case of the minor character 1, relevant episodic mem-
ories were both accessible and diagnostic, so participants simply relied mainly on them to
express intentions. Coming to the minor character 2, as Lynch pointed out [12], information
low in accessibility can be considered also less diagnostic and it may be distrusted in the judg-
ment. Therefore, the low accessibility of information about the minor character 2 could have
led participants to demote this information as less diagnostic (1.97 scenes recalled on average
vs. 3.45 scenes related to the minor character 1). As a consequence, participants relied also on
global retrospective evaluations to formulate specific intentions about this specific character.
As for the main character, the retrospective global judgment of the movie was at least partially
diagnostic for future intentions, given the prominent role of the main character in the movie.
At the same time, relevant episodic memories were highly accessible (participants were able to
recollect 3.91 related scenes on average) and also diagnostic. As a consequence, participants
relied on both these memory sources.
Regardless the character-related variation, however, the fundamental finding of Study 2
shows that when future intentions were character-specific, episodic-derived evaluations were
always taken into account and had a critical role in the prediction of future intentions, while
episodic-derived evaluations had no role when the future intentions referred to an overall
experience similar to the past one.
General discussion
In two empirical studies, we investigated the specific memory bases of future intentions about
a hedonic experience. We found that future intentions were always based on memory of simi-
lar past experiences, but the specific memory sources of future intentions (global judgments
vs. episodic memories) depended on the relative diagnosticity of these sources. When future
intentions referred to hedonic events closely related to an overall past experience (e.g., watch-
ing a movie sequel), individuals relied only on global retrospective evaluations of the past expe-
rience despite the accessibility of both the global judgment and the episodic memories about
the past experience (Study 1). However, when the global retrospective evaluation was not suffi-
ciently diagnostic for the future intentions, because the intentions referred to events related
only to specific parts of the past experience (watching a movie centred on a minor character of
the previously seen movie), specific episodic memories contributed in a critical way to the
expression of future intentions (Study 2).
In addition, in line with the literature, we observed the indirect effect of expectation on ret-
rospective evaluation through online evaluations (see [1]) and the indirect effect of online eval-
uation on future intentions. This latter evidence is fully consistent with previous work (e.g., [1,
40]) and provides further support for the hypothesis that future intentions are based on mem-
ory of past experiences and only indirectly on actual experiences.
However, these findings go beyond the observation that future intentions do depend on
memory of the previous experience (and not on how the past experience was perceived), and
they show, for the first time, that two distinct memory sources contribute differentially to
diverse kinds of future intentions, thus shedding light on the memory sources underlying
future intentions. More generally, the results show that the accessibility-diagnosticy frame-
work [3] is generally tenable also in the field of future intentions about hedonic experiences
and provide novel support for its predictions.
Importantly, our findings also support the view that global judgments and episodic-derived
evaluations represent two distinct memory sources for future intentions, in line with Hastie
and Park’s distinction [4]. Indeed, in Study 1, global judgments were not related with episodic-
derived evaluations, once controlling for the influence of expectancies and online evaluations.
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Additionally, even if we did not directly demonstrate that global judgments were formed on-
line during the hedonic experience, they were stored in memory, and accessed when they were
required to form intentions about the future, our findings are supportive of this view, showing
that online experience is strongly associated with the global retrospective judgment, with
online evaluations strongly predicting global evaluations both in Study 1 and in Study 2.
From a more general point of view, our findings suggest that detailed episodic simulations
of future experiences are not necessary to express intentions when there is a good match
between the past and the future experiences. If this is the case, individuals may rely only on
global judgments in the intention formation process even when relevant episodic memories
are still available. In line with these findings, scholars who extensively studied real-world deci-
sion making (e.g., [41]) postulate that effortful and time-consuming mental simulations of past
or future scenarios are infrequent and are typically carried out in anomalous or uncertain situ-
ations, in which recognition-based decision-making routines cannot be straightforwardly
applied. This seems to contrast with a shared view in episodic future thinking research, which
postulates that decisions about the future are based on rather detailed simulations of future
scenarios based on episodic building blocks, more or less shaped by semantic knowledge ([42–
44]; for a review, [45]). Our findings show that intention formation may not always require
simulating the future ‘episodically’ and point to the need of carrying out a deeper appraisal of
the extent to which individuals actually build detailed simulations of future scenarios to guide
their future decision behavior (see also [45–46]). Interestingly, some recent neuropsychologi-
cal investigations show that amnesic participants can make decisions similar to normal con-
trols about the future even if their episodic memory is impaired, systematically discounting
future rewards despite being unable to construct the details of either past or future events [47].
Although our studies have begun to shed light on the memory underpinnings of future
intentions, more research is still needed to get a complete picture. First, given that the enter-
tainment experience could be different according to the kind of movies and the audience (e.g.,
[48]), investigating different kinds of movies (i.e., belonging to different genres) and different
hedonic experiences would be useful and informative. It is worth noting, however, that we rep-
licated the sequential chain between expectancies, online evaluation, memory, and intentions
that has been observed with completely different hedonic experiences, such as a vacation [1]
and the fruition of public transportation [2]. This suggests that the pattern of relations between
memory and intentions might be generalized to other hedonic experiences, but actual replica-
tion of our results with further different experiences is still needed.
Second, even if the link between intentions and actual behavior were not the topic under
scrutiny in our studies, a natural extension of our research would be to appraise the consis-
tency between intentions and actual behavior.
Third, although our findings are based on an established paradigm to investigate future inten-
tions, the results are correlational and caution needs to be exerted in their interpretation. For
instance, the relationship between memory and intentions might be also reciprocal. Neverthe-
less, there is independent evidence supporting the relation from memory to intentions. Global
(retrospective) evaluations seem to precede intentions, which is a necessary condition for causal-
ity: On-line judgments leading to global retrospective evaluations can be generated even without
having any intention about the future (e.g., [4]) and summary evaluations can be generated even
automatically from experience and eventually used in the future (e.g.,[5]). Moreover, other stud-
ies showed that participants were more willing to repeat the experience that they remember to
be less painful and not the one that the online measures suggested to be less painful (e.g., [40]),
suggesting that memory, and not the actual experience, affects intentions. As already reported,
there are other studies showing that memory mediates the effect of online evaluation of the expe-
rience on future intentions (e.g., [1,2]). Finally, in the present work we also tested alternative
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models including direct relations from expectancies to intentions or from online evaluation to
intentions and these models showed nonsignificant paths and worse fit indices. Nevertheless, we
point out the need of further investigating the memory bases of future intentions with experi-
mental methods in order to bring additional support to our interpretation of the findings.
Finally, there are some minor methodological limitations that need to be addressed in
future research. First, the sample composition was gender-unbalanced. Although gender was
not expected to have any role in relation to our hypotheses given that the specific intention-
formation and memory mechanism under analysis are assumed to be relatively stable and gen-
eral, a sample with an equal gender distribution would be preferable. Second, given the time
lag between the two sessions, it cannot be excluded that participants gathered information
about the movie and, even if we kindly asked participants not to do so, we cannot really control
what participants did outside the laboratory. Future research should address this issue using
hedonic experiences for which it is not possible to obtain external information and use a sam-
ple of participants who do not know each other in order to avoid any risk of diffusion.
In conclusion, the present research provided a novel theoretical and empirical contribution
on the memory bases of future intentions by bridging work on memory-based judgments and
future intentions. Beyond offering novel empirical evidence on the memory bases of future
intentions and providing related theoretical insights, our findings have broader implications
for researchers in memory and judgment and decision making. Thus, recalling the title of our
paper, we hope that there will be sequels to our studies, which will provide further knowledge
on a research topic that has broad theoretical and applied relevance.
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